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Introduction* 
 That the development of capitalism is uneven is a fundamental conclusion of 
the Marxian analysis of accumulation, which distinguishes it from the equilibrium 
approach of the neoclassicals.  In the neoclassical approach, competition and the 
movement of capital are equilibrating forces which narrow differences among firms, 
regions, and countries.  Indeed, an apparent anomaly in neoclassical analysis is its 
prediction of a convergence of development among these, and persistent inequality 
among agents, with the latter arising because the ‘initial’ distribution of productive 
assets is taken as given.  Recent work, especially by UNCTAD (1997) and Pritchett 
(1997), has demonstrated that over the last one hundred years there is no evidence of a 
levelling convergence of growth rates, and, therefore, levels of per capita income).   
 
 This paper provides further evidence of the uneven development of capitalism 
on a world scale, and offers a theoretical explanation for the phenomenon.  We explain 
divergence in terms of primary and secondary uneven development.  Primary uneven 
development arises because of the more dynamic expansion of capitalist countries 
relatively to countries in which capitalism is incipient.  This difference is inherent in 
the social relations of capital.  Secondary uneven development occurs within the group 
of predominantly capitalist countries, due to competition and adoption of technical 
innovations within the social relations of capital.  The former generates divergence;  
the latter exhibits a cyclical pattern of convergence and divergence, with convergence 
the long term tendency. 
 
 The issue of divergence is introduced by an elaboration of the orthodox or 
neoclassical argument that trade, and trade combined with capital mobility, should 
result in the convergence of levels of development world-wide.  As for so much of 
orthodox theory, this analysis is instructive by demonstrating the highly restrictive 
conditions under which its conclusions follow logically.  The discussion then turns to 
the Marxian framework. At a superficial level, Marxian theory could also be 
interpreted as producing convergence, that non-capitalist social relations are swept 
away in favour of capitalist relations.  However, this interpretation reads Marx’s 
contribution from a neoclassical perspective.  After developing an analysis of 
divergence or uneven development, empirical evidence is presented, in order to inspect 
the particular form divergence has taken over the last four decades. 
 
 
Convergence in Neoclassical and Marxian Theory 
 
The task of a theory of growth and development has been succinctly 
summarised by Pritchett: 
Any theory that seeks to unify the world’s experience with economic growth 
and development must address at least four distinct questions:  [1] What 
accounts for continued per capita growth and technological progress of [the 
developed capitalist countries]…?  [2] What accounts for the few countries that 
are able to initiate and sustain periods of rapid growth in which they gain 
significantly on the leaders? [3] What accounts for why some countries fade 
and lose the momentum of rapid growth?  [4] What accounts for why some 
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countries remain in low growth for very long periods? (Pritchett 1997, p. 15, 
numbers added) 
 
 While a theory of capitalist development must address Pritchett’s four 
questions, he poses them without a specification of  the nature of capitalist 
accumulation.  Analytically prior to his four questions is, why does uneven 
development characterise the world?  This implies a second, historical, question:  how 
does one account for the relative concentration of capitalist development in Western 
Europe and the settler colonies of Western Europe?1   
 
 According to neoclassical economic theory, the distribution of levels of 
development on a world scale should be a simple phenomenon, derivative from 
internal characteristics of each country, and trade and capital flows.  Since economic 
phenomena are governed by universal laws of the behaviour of individual agents, there 
is no theoretical basis to expect some countries to develop faster than others.2  
External factors, also universal in character, would tend to eliminate all but minor 
differences in levels of development.  Consider first the convergence process implied 
by the neoclassical static trade model.  Exchange between countries, even in the 
absence of any movement of capital or labour between countries, should result in a 
tendency for wage rates and profit rates to equalise (so-called factor price 
equalisation).   Thus conclusion is based upon a number of specific assumptions:  1) 
all countries have access to the same technology of production (implying that every 
country can potentially produce the same range of commodities);3  2) output results 
from capital and labour, which can be substituted for each other in the production 
process;4  3)  the domestic structure of demand in each country is the same;  4) if one 
measures the ‘factor-intensity’ of a product by the ratio of capital to labour, and ranks 
all products by this ratio, the ordering is not affected by changes in wage rates or profit 
rates, and  5) markets internal to each country are perfectly competitive.5  
 
Under these assumptions, let a country shift from a closed economy (‘autarky’) 
to so-called free trade.  Each country will export the commodities that use intensively 
the factor of production that is abundant, and import commodities that are intensive in 
the factor which is scarce in the country.  As a result of the shift in resource use, the 
demand for the abundant factor will rise (increasing its price), and the demand for the 
scarce factor will fall (decreasing its price).  When all adjustments are complete, wage 
rates and profit rates will be the same in all free-trading countries.   
 
Even in its own terms, the conclusion is absurd.  It implies, for example, that 
average wages should have fallen more-or-less continuously in the advanced capitalist 
                                                          
1 The only developed country not in these two categories is Japan.  Singapore qualifies on per capita 
income, but for analytical purposes should be viewed not as a country but a city-state (e.g., it has no 
agricultural sector). 
2 See Jones (1997), where he argues that all countries would tend to have similar rates of investment. 
3 In a neoclassical world, every product is generated from a ‘production function’ that allows for 
substitution among inputs.  
4 The theory can be generalised to include labour of different skills and capital equipment of different 
types, as long as these are all available to all countries.  The factor price equalisation conclusion does 
not follow if there are production inputs that are specific to countries. 
5 This eliminates so-called ‘re-switching’, in which case changes in the ratio of profits to wages can 
result in what was previously a ‘labour-intensive’ technique becoming relatively ‘capital-intensive’ 
(see Weeks 1989, chap. 10). 
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countries over the last one hundred years (including the wages of the skilled), not 
merely to have risen slower than in the underdeveloped countries.6  However, the 
absurdity of the theory is instructive.  In a world in which all countries apply the same 
technology there would be no basis for major differences in levels of development.  
The concrete equivalent of the abstract assumption of perfect competition is that 
product and input markets operate effectively to allocate resources.  For this to occur, 
it would be necessary for production to be organised within capitalist social relations. 
If all countries were fully capitalist, utilising the same technology, then, indeed, ‘factor 
prices’ would tend to equalise, though the process would be uneven.  Therefore, 
neoclassical trade theory reaches an absurd theoretical conclusion, which is refuted by 
empirical evidence, because it excludes from its analysis the causes of uneven 
development. 
 
If one extends the neoclassical analysis to allow for capital flows, then the 
static convergence conclusion becomes dynamic:  the combination of specialisation 
according to comparative advantage and the movement of capital from labour scarce 
(developed) to labour abundant (underdeveloped) countries should combine for a 
powerful levelling effect.  In neoclassical analysis the convergence conclusion is 
unassailable theoretically, and refuted empirically.  There is no apparent exit from this 
contradiction within the neoclassical paradigm.  The standard, off-the-shelf 
neoclassical explanation for disappointing growth rates is ‘bad policies’ by 
governments (the Policy Hypothesis).  This is hardly a credible argument when low 
growth has persisted for at least one hundred years for many countries (Pritchett 
1997).7  Even were this persistence not the case, state policy as an explanation for 
different growth rates in the long run offers no explanation for our second (historical) 
question:  how the presently developed countries initially achieved their status (i.e., 
why policy wisdom was so geographically concentrated for one hundred years).  
 
While not neoclassical, Gerschenkron’s analysis of the ‘advantages of the late-
comer’ (Gerschenkron 1962) has been employed in the mainstream literature to make 
sanguine predictions that differences in level of development will tend to narrow over 
time. The essence of his argument was that ‘backward’ countries have the advantage 
of drawing on a stock of technology that was developed by the advanced countries.8  
Therefore, producers in backward countries can pass over less efficient technologies 
and move to the most developed ones.  This, combined with appropriate institutional 
arrangements,9 can produce growth rates for ‘late-comers’ considerably higher than 
those of advanced countries during their underdeveloped period.  There is clearly some 
insight in this analysis, but if taken as a general prediction, it collapses empirically.  
                                                          
6 Wages in developed countries, as well as not declining in the long run, have risen relatively to wages 
in most underdeveloped countries. 
7 One would expect that neoclassically rational policy makers would, after a few decades, learn the 
‘correct’ policies for growth. 
8 A contemporary example of the application of the Gerschenkron thesis is found in Jones (1997). 
‘Output per worker grows in the long run because of the creation of ideas’, ‘Ideas diffuse across 
countries…eventually’, and, thus, ‘All countries eventually grow at the average rate of growth of world 
knowledge’ (Jones 1997, p. 25).  It would be difficult to find a better example of a syllogism.  Among 
other things, this spurious logic ignores the possibility that the diffusion of ‘ideas’ (undefined) has a 
cost, and that ‘knowledge’ (also not defined) might be controlled by the ‘creators’ of that knowledge. 
9 Gerschenkron placed great emphasis upon actions by the state to facilitate capital accumulation.  This 
aspect of his analysis is rarely stressed in the current literature.  See Griffin (1989, pp. 100-101) for a 
discussion. 
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Most underdeveloped countries have not closed the development gap with advanced 
countries;  very few have done so.  The analysis may establish the possibility of faster 
growth rates for ‘late-comers’, but does not explain why it occurs so infrequently.   
 
On a mechanistic reading of Marx, his theory of capitalism can be interpreted 
as predicting convergence of levels of development.  If the spread of capitalist social 
relations is inexorable, then it would be only a matter of time until capitalist 
transformation of the entire world occurs.  If capital moves seeking the highest rate of 
profit, and if profits are higher in underdeveloped countries, due to lower wages, then 
there would be net capital flow from developed to underdeveloped countries.  As in 
the neoclassical case this would, through time, result in a narrowing of levels of 
development.  An argument quite close to this is found in the work of Warren (e.g., 
Warren 1973).  
 
This interpretation of capitalist development implies that capitalism is 
everywhere an engine for development;  and a country is underdeveloped because its 
social relations are incompletely capitalist. The Dependency Hypothesis is the best-
known attempt to escape from this politically unpalatable and empirically questionable 
conclusion.  The Dependency Hypothesis maintains that the development of the 
advanced countries has been at the expense of the underdeveloped countries. 
Dependency writers proposed various mechanisms by which this would occur, all of 
which reduce to underdeveloped countries suffering ‘surplus’ extraction by developed 
countries.  Like the Policy Hypothesis, the Dependency Hypothesis fails to address the 
historical question:  how did one set of countries emerge as the extractors of surplus, 
and another as the losers of surplus (Weeks 1982, pp. 119-20)? 
 
Even if the historical question were solved, the Dependency Hypothesis proves 
fatally flawed by its inability to produce a logically consistent and empirically 
verifiable mechanism for surplus extraction.  The ‘profit remittance’ mechanism fails 
on both counts.  It is a logical contradiction to argue, on the one hand, that capital 
flows to underdeveloped countries because of high rates of return, and, on the other, to 
maintain that profits are remitted rather than re-invested.  Therefore, it should not 
surprise one that empirical evidence indicates that the magnitude of profit remittances 
between underdeveloped and developed countries is far below what would be 
necessary to have a substantial growth impact (Weeks 1985, chap 2), at least, before 
the debt crisis of the 1980s.   
 
Dependency writers proposed ‘unequal exchange’ as an alternative mechanism 
for surplus extraction.  The most common form of this is the ‘declining terms of trade’ 
argument, whose more mainstream manifestation is the Prebisch-Singer thesis.  This is 
essentially an empirically-based argument:  in international trade relative prices tend to 
move against underdeveloped countries due to the internal characteristics of developed 
and underdeveloped countries.10  While this may be the case for some primary 
                                                          
10 In the Dependency interpretation, unequal exchange arises from the difference in power relations 
between ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ countries.  In the Singer-Prebisch argument, it is the nature of 
markets.  In the peripheral countries, producers are competitive and productivity increases are passed 
on as price reductions in traded goods.  In the centre countries, product markets are non-competitive, 
and productivity increases manifest themselves in part in higher price in trade.  Thus, the world prices 
of exports from peripheral countries tend to stagnate or fall, while the prices of exports form centre 
countries tend to rise.  The Singer-Prebisch argument was a product of the 1950s and 1960s, when 
economic rivalry among developed countries was latent, due to the dominant position of US capital. 
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products, such as tropical beverages, empirical studies have not demonstrated that it 
systematically operates between the two sets of countries.  An alternative somewhat 
immune to empirical refutation is the argument that differences in wage rates among 
countries result in systematic transfers of surplus (Amin 1976 and Emmanuel 1972).  
The logic is deceptively simple:  if all countries use the same technology, then profit 
rates will be higher in countries with lower wages.  The movement of capital to equate 
profit rates will lower prices in low-wage countries and raise them in high-wage 
countries.  While international prices will appear as equal exchange, they mask a 
transfer of surplus. 
 
This version of the unequal exchange argument is logically inconsistent (Dore 
and Weeks 1978).  If the commodities in question are internationally traded, it is not 
possible for them to sell at different prices in different countries without ad hoc 
institutional assumptions.   Profit rates cannot equalise, because prices must do so, 
except for non-traded commodities.11  Even were there a tendency for profits to 
equalise, despite the contradiction of a common price in international trade, the 
analysis would imply a net movement of capital to underdeveloped countries to 
equalise profit rates.  If this occurred, underdeveloped countries would grow faster 
than the developed, resulting in convergence, not the divergence that the hypothesis 
seeks to predict. 
 
Finally, there is an underlying flaw in most versions of the Dependency 
Hypothesis:  it does not attribute uneven development to capitalism.  The initial 
division of the world between develop and underdeveloped countries is taken as given 
(the historical question is begged), and the surplus transfer mechanisms could apply to 
any historical period.12  The task is to produce an analytical framework which 
accounts for divergence during the capitalist epoch, when differences in national and 
regional levels of development increased far beyond any that previously occurred. 
 
 
Competition and Uneven Development 
 
 The explanation of divergence in levels of development has two parts:  the 
character of capitalist accumulation and the nature of underdevelopment.  In the 
Marxian literature these are 1) the process of accumulation, and 2) the articulation  or 
interaction of modes of production.  The historical emergence of capitalist social 
relations, wage labour within commodity production, produced the primary 
manifestation of uneven development, which is the division of the world into 
developed and underdeveloped countries.  The interaction of technical change and 
competition within the developed capitalist countries generates a secondary uneven 
development, across industries and regions of the capitalist countries.  To explain 
these assertions, one must consider the process of capitalist development and 
accumulation. 
                                                          
11 For logical consistency, a given product must sell at a common price in international trade, regardless 
of its country of origin (ignoring transport costs).  Then, profits cannot equalise across countries 
because wage rates differ and the technology of production is the same. 
12 This is not true of the Emmanuel-Amin version of unequal exchange.  Their approach implicitly 
presumes the full development of capitalist social relations, or otherwise capital would not flow freely 
among countries. 
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 A capitalist society reproduces itself through the production and circulation of 
commodities.  The general production of commodities that characterises capitalism 
derives from the exploitation of direct producers through wage labour.  The 
development of wage labour resulted, and continues to result, from the separation of 
workers from their means of production.  The most obvious form of this separation is 
the dispossession of agricultural producers from the land, but it also applies to 
artisanal production.  Having been dispossessed, producers are reunited with the 
means of production via the agency of capital.  They become, in effect, the instruments 
of capitalist production.  This change in social relations is the basis for the dynamism 
of the capitalist mode of production.  With labour ‘free’ from the means of production, 
capital in the form of money can marshal resources flexibly.  Capitalist countries and 
the capitalist epoch are characterised by the movement of capital, as it shifts labour 
and other resources among industries and regions.  While labour remains in possession 
of its means of production, capital is constrained in its movement.  The division of the 
world during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries into advanced and backward 
countries, into colonial powers and colonies, arose from the dynamism of capitalist 
relations.  This division represents the primary aspect of uneven development on a 
world scale:  the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Germany, etc., on the 
one hand;  and the myriad of colonies (e.g., India) and semi-colonies (Latin American 
countries), on the other. 
 
In developing his analysis, Marx made methodological innovations that 
distinguished him from other critics of capitalism.  Others, for example Proudhon and 
Sismondi, criticised capitalism for excesses caused by monopoly power.  These 
allegedly produced an unequal exchange in which capitalists appropriated value from 
petty commodity producers and workers.  In contrast, Marx argued that what appears 
as excesses of capitalism are the systematic outcomes of the process of competition.  
Competition, not the lack of it, is the source of instability, crises, and uneven 
development.  This analysis for competition is the antithesis of the neoclassical 
approach, in which competition is the source of equilibrium and even development.  
Neoclassical theory treats competition in terms of the ‘representative’ firm, and 
competition creates a harmony in exchange.13  In general, radical critics of capitalism 
have accepted this approach.  If one attributes the ills of capitalism to monopoly, one 
implicitly accepts that competitive capitalism would produce a more benign outcome.  
Much of dependency analysis implicitly or explicitly relies upon a concept of 
monopoly to explain underdevelopment (see Dore and Weeks 1978).14 
 
 The nature of capitalist competition is revealed by beginning with the 
neoclassical analysis.  In a neoclassical world, markets in the short run can be afflicted 
with ‘firms’ earning excess profits.  The entry of new firms eliminates these so-called 
rents, by driving down prices, until profits have been equalised across all markets.  
The resultant prices are socially optimal, in that they reflect the social cost and benefit 
of each product.  In this schema, competition not only generates market clearing and 
equilibrium;  in the long term, it also produces a socially desirable outcome.  Non-
Marxist critiques of this line of argument have tended to focus upon the absence of 
                                                          
13 The orthodox theory of competition is treated in Weeks (1994). 
14 Consider for example, the contradictory dependency view that profit rates are higher in 
underdeveloped countries, but profits are remitted to the developed ocuntries, thus reducing the 
investible surplus.  This contradicition can be superficially resolved by assuming that foreign capital 
estalbishes monopoly positions in underdevleoped countries.  
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competition in actual markets, due to various sources of market power.  This ‘market 
failure’ approach accepts the fundamental orthodox argument:  that competition is the 
mechanism that brings forth the benign aspects of capitalism.  Neoclassical economists 
and most of their critics reach this conclusion, because competition is treated 
independently of its capitalist nature, and because production is ignored. 
 
 In a capitalist society, technical change creates the potential for variations in 
unit costs within sectors. At any moment in time, capitalist enterprises operate with 
machinery and plant whose total value (capital value) has not been recaptured through 
production and sales.  If capitalists scrapped existing techniques and replaced them 
with more efficient ones when the latter first appear, most capitals would incur losses. 
The capitalists in an industry will, if possible, delay introducing new equipment, to 
achieve the optimal trade-off between current operating costs and losses on capital 
value.  The problem need not be that lack knowledge of superior techniques, nor that 
capitals lack the finance to acquire them, though for some capitals, one or both may be 
true.  The problem is more fundamental, involving a contradiction between the forces 
and relations of production.  On the one hand, technical change offers more efficient 
methods of producing commodities.  But, techniques are ruled by capitalist rationality, 
and their use or non-use is motivated by the drive for profit.  Until the social relations 
of capital are satisfied, the law of private profitability delays innovations. 
 
 The delay in introducing innovations by some capitalists results in an uneven 
development of productive forces within an industry. At the level of appearances, 
competition fosters harmony and equilibrium, a tendency for a common price among 
producers of a similar product.  Beneath this appearance uneven development rules, 
with enterprises earning different profit rates due to different production techniques. If 
there is a systemic crisis of capitalism, which takes the form of a drop in industry 
demand, higher cost producers will become non-viable.  A systemic crisis can provoke 
a wave of bankruptcies across industries, and is the vehicle by which uneven 
development is reduced.  In the absence of a systemic crisis of aggregate demand, an 
industry can be disrupted through invasion by a new producer, who comes armed with 
more advanced techniques and without obsolete capital whose value needs recovering.  
The entry of new capital into an industry involves not the process of equilibration, but 
is the vehicle to punish high cost producers for delaying technical change. 
 
 The movement of capital among industries has a contradictory effect:  at the 
level of appearances it brings a tendency for profit rates to equalise;  beneath this 
distributional form, it creates instability and crisis for resident enterprises.  Therefore, 
it is the putatively benign aspects of capitalism, competition and innovation, which 
generate uneven development and crises (see Weeks 1981, chapters VII and VIII).  
This interaction between the forces of production (technical change) and the relations 
(competition) both undermines and rejuvenates the process of accumulation. This 
contradiction gives rise to the secondary aspect of uneven development, the decline 
and rise of industries and regions within societies that are dominated by capitalist 
relations.  Certain industries, regions within countries, and even countries may decline, 
suffering from slow growth and unemployment.  Such declines create the basis for 
their reversal, since they are associated with falling wage and non-wage costs.  The 
ebb and flow of capital within predominantly capitalist societies creates at any 
moment relatively backward regions, but these change over time. 
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 This analysis predicts that primary uneven development, between capitalist and 
non-capitalist countries, will be enduring and difficult to overcome, while secondary 
uneven development will change with the movement of capital within and among the 
predominantly capitalist countries.  It predicts a long-term tendency for convergence 
among predominantly capitalist countries, and a long term divergence between these 
countries and other countries, whose social relations are predominantly non-capitalist 
relations. 
  
 
Divergence Observed 
 
The concepts of primary and secondary uneven development provide the 
analytical basis for our review of the empirical evidence over the last four decades, 
1961-1997.  By chance major changes in the world economy occurred that roughly 
coincided with decades.  In 1971, the United States government de-linked the dollar 
from gold, ending the post-war system of fixed exchange rates.  Thus, the 1960s  
represented the last years of the post-war, Bretton Woods system of international 
economic management.  To exchange rates instability were added two waves of oil 
price increases, in 1973-74 and 1978-79, which made the 1970s a decade of economic 
profound economic disorder.  The debt crisis dominated the subsequent decade, during 
which average growth rates of almost all countries fell below their trend values.  At 
the end of the decade, the Soviet Union collapsed, profoundly altering the international 
system.  Thus, the period covers the last decade of what some have called the ‘Golden 
Age’ of twentieth century capitalism (Marglin and Schor 1988), its breakdown, and 
the subsequent international disorder. 
 
 From the perspective of the OECD countries, the 1960s were, indeed, a Golden 
Age, when growth rates across countries averaged more than five percent (see Table 
1).  This was also the period of fastest growth for the North African and Middle 
Eastern countries, and, at the least, ‘silver’ for the countries of the sub-Sahara and 
Latin America.  For the Asian groups of countries, growth rates were higher 
subsequently, in the 1970s for the East and Southeast Asia group, and in the 1980s for 
South Asia.  GDP growth rates are not the most accurate indicator of development, 
because of differences in population increase across country groups.  Table 2 shows 
the ratio of per capita income for each group of underdeveloped countries to the 
OECD average.  The ratio for the was lower in 1996-1997 than in 1961-1965 in every 
case but East and Southeast Asia group.  For example, the average for the sub-Saharan 
countries fell from 3.4 percent to 1.5 percent, and Latin America from fifteen to eleven 
percent.   
 
 Primary and secondary uneven development are indicated in Figure 1, which 
presents the standard deviation of annual growth rates (in natural logarithms) across 
countries, within each regional grouping of the underdeveloped countries and the 
OECD countries.  For the thirty-seven years, in only four is the variation among 
OECD countries equal to or greater than for any group of underdeveloped countries.  
Further, for no group of countries is there a trend.  The variation across countries tends 
to be low among the developed capitalist countries, and high among the 
underdeveloped countries.  Further, there is a strong cyclical element for the 
developed capitalist countries.  Growth rates among these countries tended to diverge 
when the cross-country average growth rate were low, and to converge when average 
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growth was high.15  This implies that during periods of rapid accumulation, the levels 
of development among the capitalist countries tended to narrow.  For none of the 
groups of underdeveloped countries is there a significant correlation between growth 
rates and their standard deviation.  These statistics suggest that when the average rate 
of growth across all countries of the world was high, the developed capitalist countries 
tended to converge, while the underdeveloped countries did not, either among 
themselves, or relatively to the developed countries. 
 
 The extent to which underdeveloped countries have diverged from the 
developed capitalist countries over the last forty years is shown in Figures 2 and 3.  
These charts show the annual difference between the growth rates of each region and 
that of the OECD countries. Inspection of Figure 2 indicates that for the sub-Saharan 
countries, divergence has been the rule.  For Latin America, only during a brief period, 
1971-1976, did per capita income rise relatively to the OECD countries.  For the North 
African and Middle Eastern countries, growth was above the OECD average in the 
1960s, but continuously below in subsequent years.  The South Asian countries 
(Figure 3) grew at a rate slightly above that for the OECD countries from the late 
1970s, allowing for a minuscule increase in relative per capita incomes, from 1.6 to 
1.8 percent of the OECD level.  At this rate of increase, it would take just over five 
hundred years for South Asian per capita income to converge to that of the OECD 
countries.  The only strong convergence is for the East and Southeast Asian countries, 
which may well have been reversed for the foreseeable future by the regional financial 
crisis of the late 1990s. 
 
Returning to Table 2, we can calculate the growth rates for country groups that 
would be necessary to return each group to its percentage level of the early 1960s.  We 
assume that the OECD countries continue to grow at their long term rate of per capita 
income increase (2.7 percent per annum).16  To return to their relative position after 
thirty-seven years (equal to the period, 1961-1997), the sub-Saharan countries would 
need to grow at over five percent per capita per annum.  This is a full five percentage 
points above the average rate for these countries over the previous thirty-seven years.  
For Latin America, a four percent rate would be required, well above what the region 
average in any decade since 1960.  More credible, but still unlikely, is the three 
percent rate for South Asia. 
 
For what they are worth, World Bank estimates of regional growth rates for 
1997-2006 confirm the probability that divergence will continue (bottom of Table 2).  
The World Bank projects that of the five underdeveloped regions, growth of per capita 
income in two will be below the OECD average (the sub-Sahara and North Africa and 
the Middle East).  For Latin America and South Asia, the World Bank projects rates 
above the OECD countries’, and well above historical performance.  Only for the East 
and Southeast Asian countries is the projection consistent with the past.  The 1997-
1998 financial crisis of these countries casts doubt upon their ability to match past 
performance.  Alternatively, we can take growth rates during 1994-1997 as indicating 
                                                          
15 Over the twenty-seven years, 1961-1997, the correlation between the average rate of growth for 
seventeen countries and the standard deviation of the growth rate (across ocuntries by year) was .68. 
16 Pritchett points out that the growth of per capita income in the advanced countries has been 
remarkably stable.  He shows, that if in 1961 one had estimated the per capita income of these 
countries for the early 1990s on the basis of previous long-term growth rates, the resulting estimate is 
within ten percent of the actual value (Pritchett 1997). 
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the future trend, when every country group’s per capita income growth was above its 
long term trend (with the exception of East and Southeast Asia).  Were these high rates 
maintained to 2006, the relative position of all groups except the East and Southeast 
Asia would deteriorate. 
 
Table 3 provides a crude measure of whether divergence can be explained by 
the degree to which a country group is linked to OECD growth.  It suggests that lack 
of integration into the world economy cannot explain the long-term deterioration of 
relative per capita income for most underdeveloped countries.  The table reports the 
simple correlation between annual growth rates of the OECD countries and each 
underdeveloped region.  Of the five regions, the correlation is highest for the sub-
Saharan countries.  Growth for the sub-Saharan countries has tended to rise and fall 
with OECD growth, such that a one percent rise in the latter is associated with a .64 
percent rise in the latter.  However, over the long term OECD growth has been 
considerably higher.  For all groups but the South Asian, there is significant 
correlation with OECD growth, but this has been associated with divergence, not 
convergence, in levels of development.  We interpret this divergence to be the result of 
primary uneven development:  the tendency for growth to be more rapid within 
predominantly capitalist social relations. 
 
From a neoclassical perspective, part of the explanation for divergence can be 
explained by the absence of substantial redistribution of capital from advanced to 
underdeveloped countries.  Table 4 shows net direct foreign investment by the major 
industrial economies, with the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan 
listed separately.  In contradiction to the prediction of orthodox theory, the largest 
capitalist country, the United States, was a net recipient of foreign investment in all 
years.  For all countries, there was a net flow to underdeveloped countries in the 
second half of the 1980s and 1990s, but relatively small.  Even for the 1990s, foreign 
investment into the United States (seventeen billion UD dollars) approached the total 
for all underdeveloped countries (twenty-one billion). For the most part capitalist 
enterprises in advanced countries invest in their ‘own’ or other advanced countries. 
 
Figure 4 shows the relative low level of foreign direct investment from 
advanced to underdeveloped countries.  Except for China, foreign investment played a 
relatively small role in gross domestic investment.  In Latin America, foreign 
investment was consistently below ten percent of total investment for the entire 
twenty-six year period, with no trend if one accounts for the cycle of depression and 
recovery;  i.e., foreign investment accounted for about the same percentage in the mid-
1990s as in the early 1970s.  For the major Asian countries, foreign investment in no 
year reached as much as four percent of total investment.  Contrary to what one might 
expect, foreign investment has been of greater relative importance in the sub-Saharan 
region than in Asia (the former greater than the latter in all but three years),17 though 
considerably more volatile.  The only major country in which foreign investment has 
played a substantially increasing role in total investment has been China.  If China is 
excluded, the relative quantitative importance of foreign direct investment in 
underdeveloped countries was no greater in the 1990s than in the 1970s. 
 In this context, we can note that the evidence that most foreign direct 
investment is among developed capitalist countries, not from these countries to 
                                                          
17 Most of the investment in the sub-Saharan region was in the mining sector, and had limited impact 
on affecting social relations in the countries. 
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underdeveloped regions, is consistent with our concept of primary uneven 
development.  One would expect that capital would flow to countries and regions 
characterised by capitalist social relations, for the persistence of non-capitalist 
relations is associated with institutional barriers to such flows. 
Overall, the evidence is clear:  during the three decades international capital 
did not dramatically accelerate its expansion into the underdeveloped world.  On the 
contrary, the dramatic expansion was within the advanced capitalist countries.  One 
would not expect capitalism to foster an equitable distribution of income and wealth 
on a national level.  Nor did it foster a general convergence of capitalist development 
around the globe.  Within capitalist relations, accumulation fosters convergence;  
while growth among countries at quite different levels of capitalist development 
produces divergence. 
 
 
Convergence and Divergence 
 
 Our general conclusion, that capitalist countries converge among themselves,18 
and diverge from countries in which capitalist relations remain underdeveloped, does 
not explain the historical division of countries into the two groups.  The historical 
explanation is straight-forward:  the transition from slow to rapid economic growth is 
achieved through the development of capitalist social relations.  This is essentially a 
process internal to each social formation, influenced, but not determined, by external 
factors.  The extent to which trade and investment flows foster capitalist development 
within a social formation is primarily determined by the nature of the non-capitalist 
relations themselves.  Since non-capitalist relations can take many forms, no general 
theory of transition to capitalism is possible.19 
 Through a process taking several centuries, capitalism developed in Western 
Europe,20 establishing itself as the dominant mode of exploiting labour during the 
second half of the eighteenth century.  During the nineteenth century, capitalism 
spread through the countries of this region.  Because of the close integration of these 
countries in trade and finance, the development of capitalism in this region should be 
viewed as a single historical process;  i.e., it should not be analysed as a number of 
separate transitions.  The next ‘wave’ of capitalist development, in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, involved only two transitions, Italy and Japan.  In these 
countries, feudal and semi-feudal social relations were replaced by the social relations 
of capital.  The other countries that emerged as capitalist during this period were 
settler states:  the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and, unsuccessfully, 
Argentina and Uruguay.  If the history of global capitalist teaches any lesson, it is that 
the transition is a protracted process, dominated by uneven development, in which 
divergence is the rule and convergence the exception. 
 
                                                          
18 This is a central conclusion of the empirical work of Pritchett (1997). 
19 For example, see Byres (1997), for an analysis of the diversity in the development of capitalism in 
agriculture. 
20 That is, the United Kingdom, Ireland, France, Germany, the Low Countries, and Scandinavia. 
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Table 1:  GDP Growth Rates by Country Groups, 1961-1997 
Group:
Period 
OECD SSA LA ESEA SoAsia NAME 
1961-1971 5.2 4.2 4.9 6.7 4.3 8.5 
1971-1980 3.5 3.8 4.2 7.2 3.4 6.8 
1981-1989 2.9 2.5 1.1 5.7 5.1 3.3 
1990-1997 2.4 2.0 3.9 5.6 4.5 3.5 
average 3.6 3.1 3.5 6.4 4.4 5.6 
World Bank 
Predictions, 
1997-2006 
 
2.8 
 
4.1 
 
4.2 
 
6.0* 
 
5.9 
 
3.6 
 
Notes: *The World Bank predicts a GDP growth rate for East and South East Asia of  7.6 percent per 
annum, and per capita as 6.6.  This has been reduced to 6.0 for GDP and 4.5 for GDP per capita for two 
reasons:  1) the collapse of ESEA growth rates in 1997 and 1998 makes 7.6 an impossible target;  and 2) 
the implied rate of population increase (one percent per annum) is certainly too low. 
North Africa and Middle East group covers 1993-1997.  China excluded from Asia groups. 
OECD (Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development, developed countries) - Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of 
America. 
SSA (Africa south of the Sahara) – All continental countries south of the Sahara except Eritrea, 
Djibouti, Namibia, South Africa, Somalia 
LA (Latin America) – All Spanish-speaking countries (except Cuba) and Brazil. 
ESE - Asia (East & Southeast Asia) – Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand 
SoAsia (South Asia) – Bangladesh, Nepal, India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan 
NAME (North Africa & the Middle East) – Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Oman, Syria, Saudi 
Arabia, Tunisia 
Source:  World Development Indicators, CD-ROM (1961-1995), United Nations (1998), & World Bank 
(1997). 
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Table 2:  Relative Per Capita Incomes by Region, 1961-1997 
(absolute numbers in US$ of 1990) 
OECD SSA LA ESEA SoAsia NAME 
PCY 1961-65 9015 306 1391 155 185 1232 
Percentage of OECD:       
1961-65  3.4 15.4 1.7 2.0 13.7 
1971-75  2.7 13.7 1.8 1.6 15.7 
1981-85  2.2 13.6 2.4 1.6 13.6 
1991-95  1.6 11.3 3.8 1.7 8.8 
1996-97  1.5 11.2 4.6 1.8 8.5 
PCY 1996-97 21,540 326 2,405 982 395 1,826 
Rate of increase of       
PCY, 37 years* 2.7 0.2 1.7 5.7 2.3 1.2 
Rate required to regain 
1961-65 ratio to 
OECD in 37 years 
 
 
 
5.3 
 
3.8 
 
Not app 
 
3.1 
 
4.3 
(Speculation) 
World Bank 
Predictions, 
1997-2006 
(actual 1994-97) 
 
 
2.3 
 
(2.7) 
 
 
1.2 
 
(0.3) 
 
 
2.7 
 
(2.0) 
 
 
4.5**
 
(4.1) 
 
 
4.1 
 
(2.6) 
 
 
1.1 
 
(1.2) 
Percentage of OECD, 
2006, WB predictions 
(2006, actual 1994-97) 
  
1.4 
(1.2) 
 
11.6 
(10.4) 
 
5.6 
(5.2) 
 
2.2 
(1.8) 
 
7.2 
(7.3) 
Note: 
A rise in a region’s percentage is noted by bold. 
PCY – per capita income 
*Compound rate, average of 1961-65 to average of 1996-97 
**See note to Table 1. 
 
 
 
Table 3: GDP Growth Correlations:  OECD  
and Country Groups, 1961-1997 
Country group Elasticity R2 F-stat 
SSA* .643 .345 .01 
Latin America .789 .294 .01 
ESEA .637 .252 .01 
South Asia -.257 .042 ns 
NAME .884 .138 .05 
*OECD growth lagged one year.  The elasticity using current 
periods is .518, with an r-square of .222. 
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Table 4:  Net Direct Foreign Investment Flows into Major Industrial 
Countries, 1980-1996 (billions of current US dollars) 
USA UK Germany Japan Other Total 
1980 9.5 -2.5 -2.7 -2.1 -2.2 0.0 
1981 26.2 -5.3 -2.7 -4.7 -9.1 4.4 
1982 19.9 -0.8 -1.8 -4.1 -0.2 13.0 
1983 18.6 -1.5 -1.4 -3.2 -1.4 11.1 
1984 28.3 -5.2 -2.5 -6.0 -4.1 10.5 
1985 21.3 -4.3 -3.3 -5.8 -10.5 -2.6 
1986 26.4 -3.7 -7.5 -14.3 -9.7 -8.8 
1987 47.3 -9.0 -7.8 -18.4 -10.0 2.1 
1988 52.1 -5.3 -10.1 -34.7 -6.9 -4.9 
1989 51.5 3.7 -7.4 -45.2 -15.9 -13.3 
1990 53.0 24.5 -17.1 -46.3 -15.8 -1.7 
1991 27.1 9.7 -17.5 -30.2 -12.9 -23.8 
1992 4.6 5.5 -16.1 -14.6 -0.8 -21.4 
1993 5.0 -1.4 -12.6 -13.7 0.1 -22.6 
1994 24.2 -3.3 -9.7 -17.2 -13.5 -19.5 
1995 5.9 -5.8 -23.9 -22.6 17.8 -28.6 
1996 35.4 6.7 -27.1 -21.7 -4.0 -10.7 
annual average 
1980-85 20.6 -3.3 -2.4 -4.3 -4.6 6.1 
1986-90 46.1 2.0 -10.0 -31.8 -11.7 -5.3 
1991-96 17.0 1.9 -17.8 -20.0 -2.2 -21.1 
Source:  United Nations (1986, 1991, 1998) 
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Figure 1: 
 
 
 
Standard Deviation of Growth Rates (natural log) 
by Region, 1961-1997
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 Figure 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
Differences in Per Capita Growth, the Sub-Sahara, Latin America 
& NAME, and the OECD Countries, 1961-1997
(five-year moving average)
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Figure 3: 
 
 
Differences in Per Capita Growth, SE&E and South Asia, and 
OECD Countries, 1961-1997
(five-year moving average)
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Figure 4: 
 
Foreign Direct Investment as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Investment, 
by Region and China, 1970-1995
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Notes:
LA includes all Spanish-speaking countries (except Cuba) & Brazil;  
SSA  all sub-Saharan countries for which there were data (32);   
Asia* includes Bangladesh (after 1975), India, Indonesia, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Pakistan,  Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand  (but not China)
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